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Abstract  
Decision-making is often accompanied by a degree of confidence on whether a choice is 
correct. Decision uncertainty, or lack in confidence, may lead to change-of-mind. Studies have 
identified the behavioural characteristics associated with decision confidence or change-of-
mind, and their neural correlates. Although several theoretical accounts have been proposed, 
there is no neural model that can compute decision uncertainty and explain its effects on 
change-of-mind. We propose a neuronal circuit model that computes decision uncertainty 
while accounting for a variety of behavioural and neural data of decision confidence and 
change-of-mind, including testable model predictions. Our theoretical analysis suggests that 
change-of-mind occurs due to the presence of a transient uncertainty-induced choice-neutral 
stable steady state and noisy fluctuation within the neuronal network. Our distributed network 
model indicates that the neural basis of change-of-mind is more distinctively identified in 
motor-based neurons. Overall, our model provides a framework that unifies decision 
confidence and change-of-mind. 
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Introduction 
The decisions we make are often accompanied by a degree of uncertainty – how likely a 
decision will be correct1–3. Some decisions are more difficult than others, inducing an internal 
conflict that may lead to reconsideration or change-of-mind4,5. Likewise, challenging decisions 
are associated with higher uncertainty, more errors and longer response times1,6,7. This high 
uncertainty could also result in subsequent behavioural adjustments, affecting how quickly 
and accurately we make consecutive decisions8,9. Several theoretical and experimental 
accounts posit that uncertainty is computed while making decisions6,7,10–15. However, how 
decision uncertainty is encoded in the brain and the neural mechanism by which it affects 
changes-of-mind and subsequent behavioural adjustments has, so far, remained elusive16–18.  
The neural correlates of decision uncertainty have been gradually revealed in animal and 
human studies6,7,13,19–21. For instance, neural recordings from animals demonstrated a strong 
correlation between lower-rate neuronal firing activity in the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) of 
the cortex and high decision uncertainty7. Computational models have accounted for this, 
suggesting that neural responses are represented by probability distributions, where 
uncertainty can be quantified by evaluating the posterior probability10,22. These models, 
however, imply Bayesian optimality23, with no consensus on how this optimality emerges from 
the neurobiology8,24.  
Other experimental studies have shown weaker linkage between choice accuracy and 
uncertainty-level reporting6,11,19,25,26. For instance, patients with lesions in the prefrontal cortex 
demonstrated poor confidence reporting performance, while choice accuracy was largely 
unaffected19. Several computational models support this view by predicting a dissociation 
between uncertainty and the formation of a perceptual decision27,28. For instance, in one 
model27, an extension of the drift-diffusion decision-making model (for evidence accumulation) 
29,30, the evidence accumulation continues after a decision is reached, and hence a post-
decision confidence rating can be provided. Specifically, the parameters controlling the post-
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decision stage are independent from the ones that control initial decision processing stage.  
Changing one’s mind has been attributed to processing new evidence that negates a 
previous judgement4. More recent neurophysiological evidence has shown that some 
changes-of-mind occur as a result of an internal error-correction mechanism25, suggesting 
decision uncertainty plays a role in inducing changes-of-mind31. However, the neural 
mechanism of decision uncertainty (within a single trial or across consecutive ones) and its 
link to change-of-mind has so far remained ambiguous. In particular, there is no neural circuit 
model that explains this shared neural mechanism17.  
Within the studies of perceptual decision confidence/uncertainty and change-of-mind, there 
are some common findings that have been identified (Supplementary Figs. 1 and 2). Firstly, 
more difficult tasks, associated with lower (sensory) evidence quality, lead to higher decision 
uncertainty, which is also associated with lower choice accuracy (Supplementary Fig. 1) 6,32. 
Secondly, higher decision uncertainty is associated with lower evidence quality for correct 
choices while counter-intuitively associated with better evidence quality for incorrect choices 
(forming the often observed “<” pattern) (Supplementary Fig.1) 6,11,33,34. Thirdly, changes-of-
mind are more likely to occur when the task is more difficult, and more often accompanied by 
correcting an initial impending error choice – hence more error-to-correct changes than 
correct-to-error changes4,35 (although the difference has been shown to vary in some cases35). 
Further, the likelihood of correct changes-of-mind (to the subsequent correct choices) may 
peak at an intermediate level of task difficulty and then decrease gradually when the task 
becomes much easier (Supplementary Fig. 2) 4,35.  
In this work, and to the best of our knowledge, guided by the above findings and related 
neural data (Supplementary Fig. 3), we have developed the first cortical neural circuit 
computational model that can mechanistically quantify and monitor decision uncertainty, which 
may subsequently cause a change-of-mind, hence unifying the two areas of study. Our multi-
layer recurrent network model not only accounts for the abovementioned key characteristics 
of decision uncertainty6,10,36 and change-of-mind4,35 across a wide variety of experiments (of 
both behavioural and neural data) but also sheds light on their neural circuit mechanisms. In 
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particular, using dynamical systems analysis, we show that change-of-mind occurs due to the 
presence of a transient choice-neutral stable steady state together with noisy fluctuations 
within the neuronal network. Interestingly, because our model consists of multiple layers of 
neural integrators, we found that the reversal of competing neural activities encoding the 
choices (neural basis for change-of-mind) is more likely to be more distinctive for neurons near 
the motor execution area, without necessarily requiring a clear reversal of neural activities at 
more upstream sensory or sensorimotor neurons.  
Results 
Neural circuit model computes decision uncertainty 
We propose a novel neural circuit model that can encode, quantify, and monitor decision 
uncertainty, which we named the decision uncertainty-monitoring module (Fig. 1a, Uncertainty 
Monitoring box). This circuit is built on our previous biologically-motivated neural circuit model 
of decision-making that focuses on sensory evidence accumulation37 (Fig. 1a).  
The uncertainty-monitoring module receives input based on the summed sensorimotor 
neuronal populations activities (Fig. 1a and b). In particular, a population of inhibitory neurons 
(Fig. 1a, green circle) integrates these summed activities (Fig. 1a, blue and orange pointed 
arrows; Methods). This neuronal population in turn inhibits a neighbouring excitatory neuronal 
population that encodes decision uncertainty (Fig. 1a, magenta circle). Hence, decision 
uncertainty can be continuously monitored (Fig. 1b, middle). Together, the network structure 
with these two neuronal populations is reminiscent of a cortical column38.  
Further, decision uncertainty information from the uncertainty-monitoring module is 
continuously fed back equally to the sensorimotor neuronal populations (Fig. 1a, Sensorimotor 
box), thus providing, effectively, an excitatory feedback mechanism between the two brain 
systems, which consequently may affect the final decision outcome, and in some instances, 
even lead to change-of-mind, as we shall demonstrate below. This feedback loop, as in control 
theory, provides the key computational basis of linking decision uncertainty and change-of-
mind. Without this feedback loop, the model does not exhibit change-of-mind behaviour.  
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(Supplementary Fig. 4). However, it can still encode decision uncertainty and produce the 
experimentally-observed relationship between decision uncertainty and task difficulty 
(Supplementary Fig. 5).  In addition, the neural circuit model also has motor-based neuronal 
populations either located within the same brain region or downstream in the decision-
processing pathway (Fig. 1a, Motor box). Inputs to these populations are temporally integrated 
based on the neural firing rate outputs of the associated sensorimotor neuronal populations 
(Fig. 1b, bottom; Methods).  
 
Figure 1 | Schematic diagram and performance of the distributed neural circuit model. (a) The 
model consists of three modules. The uncertainty-monitoring module consists of two neuronal 
 6 
populations. Inhibitory neuronal population (green) receives excitatory input (straight arrows) from 
output of sensorimotor module while inhibiting the uncertainty-encoding neuronal population (lines with 
filled circles), which in turn provides excitatory feedback to sensorimotor module. The uncertainty-
encoding population (magenta) receives a constant tonic excitatory input which varies across trials in 
specific cases (i.e. multi-stage paradigm, see Methods and below). The sensorimotor module consists 
of two competing (mutually inhibitory) neuronal populations each selective to noisy sensory information 
(e.g. rightward or leftward random-dot motion stimulus) favouring one of two (e.g. right R or left L) choice 
options. The motor module, receiving inputs from sensorimotor module, also consist of neural 
integrators that report the choice made. See Supplementary Note 1 for justifications of our modelling 
choices. (b) Timecourse of neuronal population firing rates averaged over non-change-of-mind trials 
with evidence quality, 𝜀 = 25.6% (easy task; solid lines) and 𝜀 = 3.2% (difficult task; dashed lines), 
where 𝜀 is equivalent to motion coherence in the classic random-dot stimulus. Faster ramping activity 
(top and bottom panels) with lower uncertainty quantification (middle panel; red) with larger 𝜀. Colour 
of activity traces reflects the associated neural populations in (a). To reveal the full network dynamics, 
the network activities (greyed out) were not reset after a choice was made. (c) Psychometric function 
used to fit choice accuracy (using a Weibull function, see Methods). (d) Response times for correct 
(black) and error (grey) responses from the model. In this example, the activation onset times for the 
inhibitory and uncertainty-encoding neuronal populations are 400 ms and 500 ms after stimulus onset, 
respectively. 
 
The general model behaviour, ultimately reported at the motor neuronal populations, is 
qualitatively similar to the neuronal firing rates and psychophysical (choice accuracy and 
response time) data observed in two-choice reaction time experiments4,39,40. Specifically, the 
neural activity of the winning (sensorimotor/motor) neuronal population ramps up faster with 
higher evidence quality (𝜀 = 25.6% cf. 3.2%; equivalent to motion coherence in random dot 
stimulus – see Methods) (Fig. 1b, top and bottom panels); accuracy increases monotonically 
with evidence quality (Fig. 1c) while reaction time decreases (with error choices slower than 
correct choices) (Fig. 1d; compared with39,41). A choice is considered to be made when one of 
the activities of the motor neuronal populations crosses a prescribed threshold of 17.4 Hz. The 
motor neuronal population activity is also directly mapped onto the motor output or positional 
space (see Methods and below).  
Importantly, the (phasic) activity of the uncertainty-encoding neuronal population is higher 
for trials with higher uncertainty (due to lower evidence quality) (Fig. 1b, middle panel). This 
rise-and-decay activity around the motor movement onset is consistent with observations from 
neural recordings in animal and human studies6,11,25,42. More specifically, single neuronal firing 
activity in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (from rodents)6,11, EEG25 and fMRI42 recordings in 
humans exhibited this rise-and-decay pattern in experimental studies of decision-making 
under uncertainty (Supplementary Fig. 3), and these activities are higher with higher decision 
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uncertainty. We shall henceforth use this phasic neural activity as an indicator of decision 
uncertainty monitoring in real-time, and the temporal integral of its neural activity (i.e. area 
under the curve as a proxy for any downstream neural integrator) as a readout of the decision 
uncertainty (see Methods). Further, a tonic constant excitatory bias input to the uncertainty-
encoding population (Fig. 1a) is required to provide overall excitation (see Methods). As will 
be shown below, when trials are sequentially dependant (i.e. a reward is only received when 
a pair of coupled trials result in two correct choices), this same parameter is linearly varied 
based on the level of uncertainty in the first trial, influencing the uncertainty level (and 
response time) of the second trial43 (see below and Methods).  
 
Model accounts for behavioural patterns of choice uncertainty 
 
We next simulate with our network model to replicate the key experimental findings related 
to decision uncertainty and confidence as discussed in the Introduction. As most of the 
decision uncertainty and change-of-mind tasks are based on two-choice reaction-time task 
paradigms, we shall only focus on such paradigms. Our model first replicates choice accuracy 
decreasing monotonically with decision uncertainty (Fig. 2a), while producing the ‘<’ 
pattern6,11,33,34 of decision uncertainty (Fig. 2b), in which decision uncertainty is higher for lower 
(higher) evidence quality in correct (error) choices6,34 (compared to  Supplementary Fig. 1). 
This pattern also correlates with the response time pattern in Fig. 1d. We further explore this 
by performing a linear regression on all our simulated response times with decision uncertainty 
levels (maximum activity, see Methods) and found very strong correlation (Pearson’s r = 0.85) 
between the two as observed in experiments12 (see Supplementary Figure 6).  
To explain the results in Figs. 2a and b, we map out the neural activity of the uncertainty-
encoding population (denoted by the colours in Figs. 2c and d) with respect to the evidence 
quality and total input to the uncertainty-encoding neuronal population. Based on Figs. 2c and 
d, it is clear that as long as the total input is high, and there is sufficient time (i.e. long response 
time – see Fig. 1d) for the uncertainty-encoding population to integrate its input, the uncertainty 
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level will be high, regardless of correct or error responses. From the perspective of the network 
dynamics, for correct responses with low evidence quality, the inhibition to the uncertainty-
encoding population will initially be higher, i.e. lower total input. This leads to an initial weaker 
excitatory feedback to the sensorimotor neural populations, causing the ramping-up speed of 
the latter’s activity to become slower, which in turn results in a prolonged response time. The 
longer response time allows the uncertainty-encoding population to have more time to 
integrate and eventually attains a higher activity level, i.e. encodes higher uncertainty. The 
activities of the competing sensorimotor populations will also eventually deviate (i.e. have a 
clear winner), resulting in higher total input (i.e. less inhibition) to the uncertainty-encoding 
population (moving vertically upwards in Fig. 2c, left side). For correct responses with higher 
evidence quality, the response times are typically faster (Fig. 1d, black), and hence allowing 
for less time for the uncertainty-encoding population to integrate, leading to lower uncertainty 
activity levels (moving vertically upwards in Fig. 2c, right side; see also Supplementary Fig. 
7). However, for error responses, the response times are longer for higher evidence quality 
(Fig. 1d, grey), and that allows for more time for the uncertainty-encoding population to 
integrate. This results in higher uncertainty levels (Fig. 2d, right side). See Supplementary Fig. 
8 for a sample trial with a long response time where the uncertainty-monitoring module has 
sufficient time to integrate.  
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Figure 2 | Model accounts for behavioural patterns of decision uncertainty (a) Choice accuracy 
as a function of decision uncertainty (based on peak value of uncertainty-encoding neuronal population 
activity). The break in the horizontal axis is at 0.6. (b) Decision uncertainty as a function of evidence 
quality 𝜀. Grey (black): error (correct) choices. Bold (dashed): Uncertainty measure based on averaged 
peak (peak) or temporal integral (area) of the uncertainty-encoding neuronal population activity 
(Methods). Error bars are s.e.m. (c-d) Activity level of uncertainty-encoding population depends on the 
total input to the uncertainty-encoding population and evidence quality. Uncertainty activity level is 
normalised (see Methods). (c) Correct responses. Activity of uncertainty-encoding population is higher 
for correct responses in difficult tasks (lower 𝜀) due to prolonged response times (RTs) (Fig. 1d), 
allowing the uncertainty-encoding population longer time to integrate. See text for more detailed 
description. (d) Error responses. Activity of uncertainty-encoding population is higher during errors in 
easier tasks (higher 𝜀) due to prolonged RTs (Fig. 1d), allowing the uncertainty-encoding population 
longer time to integrate.  
 
Previous work using a multi-stage decision task paradigm has shown that the level of 
decision uncertainty can affect the response time in a subsequent decision – a form of optimal 
strategy43. Specifically, this only occurs if the reward is tied to two consecutive decisions being 
answered correctly (i.e. coupled trials). By allowing the same tonic bias input to the 
uncertainty-encoding population in the second trial to vary linearly based on the decision 
 10 
uncertainty in the first trial of each pair of coupled trials (see Methods), our model can replicate 
this behaviour (Fig. 3a), exhibiting a prolonged response time in the second decision if the first 
decision is correct. (Fig. 3a). This trend holds regardless of the evidence quality, with the 
exception of the lowest difficulty level (due to very low uncertainty levels during these tasks; 
see Figs. 1d and 2c). The model naturally accounts for this as the neural activity encoding the 
uncertainty level in the first decision is carried over to the second decision – e.g. higher tonic 
input with higher decision uncertainty level in the previous trial (Methods). This in turn 
accelerates (decelerates) the ramping-up of neural activity in the sensorimotor populations 
and hence decreases (increases) the response time.  
 
Figure 3 | Model accounts for and predicts subsequent response times. (a) Normalized response 
times of the 2nd decision when the first decision is correct (black) and error (grey). The model exhibits 
faster response times, when the 1st decision is error compared to correct replicating experimental 
observations43. (b) Response times of the second decisions are further split into error (grey) and correct 
(black) decisions. Model predicts a slightly bigger difference between 2nd error responses (bold vs. 
dashed grey lines) than 2nd correct responses (bold vs. dashed black lines). Error bars are s.e.m.  
 
Next, we sort the simulated trials based on the outcome of both the 1st and 2nd decisions 
(in each coupled pair) (Fig. 3b), i.e. correct-error combinations (see Supplementary Note 1 for 
more details on how we simulated the multi-stage paradigm). Interestingly, the model predicts 
a slightly larger difference when the second responses are error choices (grey lines) than 
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when the second responses are correct choices (black lines). This difference (between the 
correct and error choices) is more pronounced with increasing evidence quality. This can be 
explained by Fig. 2d: due to the prolonged response time during error choices with higher 
evidence quality (Fig. 1d) (leading to longer integration time for the uncertainty-encoding 
population) and a higher total input to the uncertainty-encoding population, higher uncertainty 
level is reached. Hence, the larger difference.  
 
Model accounts for change-of-mind 
Previous studies have shown that change-of-mind during decision-making usually leads to 
the correction of an impending error4,35. Although previous studies have linked change-of-mind 
to the temporal integration of noisy stimulus4,35, we demonstrate that the simulated change-
of-mind in our biologically-motivated model is due not only to noise, but more importantly, to 
the necessity of an excitatory feedback mechanism induced by decision uncertainty 
(Supplementary Figs. 4, 7 and 8). In particular, our network model replicates the 
observation4,35 that the probability of change-of-mind decreases monotonically with evidence 
quality with the majority of trials leading to ultimately correct choices (Fig. 4a). Further, and 
consistent with existing observations4,35, changes to correct choices peak at an intermediate 
evidence quality level before gradually decreasing (Fig. 4a). Moreover, our model predicts that 
response times are slower during change-of-mind, regardless of evidence quality (Fig. 4b, 
overlapping bold and dashed lines). When there is no uncertainty excitatory feedback loop, 
decision uncertainty can still be encoded (Supplementary Fig. 5) but there is no change-of-
mind (Supplementary Fig. 4). This suggests that for the biophysically-constrained network 
model, noisy fluctuation may be necessary but not sufficient to allow significant change-of-
mind behaviour. Importantly, a choice-neutral stable steady state (or attractor) due to 
nonlinearity may be needed.  
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Figure 4 | Model accounts for and predicts key characteristics of change-of-mind. (a) Probability 
of change-of-mind with respect to evidence quality. Probability of change-of-mind for a single evidence 
quality level is calculated by dividing the total number of change-of-mind trials by the total number of 
simulated trials for a specific evidence quality level (see Methods). Grey: Total probability of change-
of-mind, consisting of both correct and error choices. Solid black (dashed black): only subsequent 
correct (error) change-of-mind choices. Probability of change-of-mind for subsequent correct choices 
peak at 𝜀 = 3.2, before decreasing. (b) Response times are slower during change-of-mind (regardless 
of whether they are correct (dashed green) or error (bold brown)). Error bars are s.e.m. 
 
Experimental observations have shown that the neural instantiation of change-of-mind is 
associated with a reversal of dominance of neural activities over time within a trial44.  In our 
model simulation with change-of-mind, the firing-rate activities of the competing sensorimotor 
neuronal populations reverse their order of dominance over time within a trial (see 
Supplementary Figs. 8 and 9a for sample change-of-mind trials). Fig. 5a shows the trial-
averaged activity traces of such reversal condition, which can be directly mapped, via the 
motor neuronal population activity (activity is shown in Fig. 5a, middle panel) into a motor 
output position in the spatial X direction (Fig. 5a, bottom; see Supplementary Fig. 9a bottom 
for a sample trial). We can observe switching of neural activity dominance of the sensorimotor 
neuronal populations (Fig. 5a, top). Note that although the switching of dominance can be 
small, the difference in activities is integrated and amplified by the motor neuronal populations 
(Fig 5a, middle), leading to an initial bias towards choice 1/Left (negative X position) (see also 
Supplementary Figs. 8 and 9a). Further, it should be noted that activities of both sensorimotor 
neural populations can return to their spontaneous levels – but the activities of the motor 
neuronal populations could still continue to integrate over time, magnifying the difference in 
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sensory evidence, and hence the motor output can move towards a choice target (Fig. 5a, 
bottom; see also Supplementary Fig. 9a for a sample trial).  
 
A neural circuit mechanism of change-of-mind 
Next, we will apply dynamical systems analysis37 to demonstrate that this reversal 
phenomenon is caused not only by noise and strong sensory evidence favouring one 
population over the other, as indicated in previous modelling work35, but also due to the 
effective excitatory feedback of the uncertainty-monitoring module. Similar to our previous 
work37,45, we plotted the phase planes of the activities of the sensorimotor neuronal 
populations – which are governed by their slow (NMDA-mediated) population-averaged 
synaptic gating variables, S1 and S2 (Figs. 5b-d). These gating variables are monotonic 
functions of their associated neuronal population firing rates37,45. The stimulus is presented 
with low evidence quality (𝜀 = 3.2%). Shown in blue and orange curves in Figs. 5b-d are the 
nullclines of the sensorimotor module, and their intersections are the steady states – the 
middle saddle-like steady state (or saddle fixed point) in Figs. 5b and d is unstable while the 
more off-diagonal ones are stable steady states associated with the choices (or choice 
attractor states) (Methods). For the latter, the choice attractor closer to the S1 (S2) axis 
represents the stable (final) state for making choice 1/Left (2/Right).  
 
Figure 5. Neural circuit mechanism of change-of-mind behaviour. (a) Trial-averaged (n=17) 
timecourse of firing rates in sensorimotor module (top), motor module (middle) and corresponding motor 
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trajectory (bottom). Evidence quality ε = 3.2 (favouring population/choice 2/Right). Populations 
compete after stimulus onset (time 0). As motor starts moving in one direction (without reaching the 
target), a reversal of neural activity dominance in sensorimotor module occurs, leading to a change-of-
mind. Note: final decision is made by the motor output in X space (bottom).  (b) Immediately upon 
stimulus onset (ε = 3.2, favouring choice 2/Right), the sensorimotor population activity trajectory (black 
dotted line) in phase space deviates from phase plane diagonal. Black filled circles: stable steady states 
representing the two choices i.e. choice attractors; grey filled circle: saddle-like unstable steady state. 
Refer to main manuscript regarding content of the phase plane (e.g. nullclines) (c) During the middle 
epoch of the trial, large excitatory feedback from uncertainty-monitoring module causes phase plane to 
reconfigure, and a new choice-neutral stable steady state appears which aids the initially losing neural 
population (population 2). Trajectory is now drawn towards this stable steady state, towards the phase 
plane diagonal. Inset: Zoom in. (d) During the later epoch of the trial, both sensorimotor populations 
receive lesser excitatory feedback from the uncertainty-monitoring module, resulting in the phase plane 
reverting closer to the previous condition during the early epoch of the trial.   
 
With a difficult task (small bias in the phase plane), the sensorimotor neuronal populations 
integrate sensory evidence and ramp up their activities towards one of the two choice 
attractors, and on average, almost along the phase-plane diagonal (Fig. 5b, black dotted 
trajectory). Fluctuations due to noise contribute mainly to the initial dominance in the neural 
activities, in this case favouring choice 1/Left. This leads to high inhibition of the uncertainty-
encoding population and weak excitatory feedback to the sensorimotor populations. The 
prolonged ramping up of the activities of the sensorimotor populations eventually allows 
integration of the activity of the uncertainty-encoding neuronal population and provides 
excitatory feedback to the sensorimotor module. This leads to the reconfiguration of the phase 
space and the creation of a new central and choice-neutral stable steady state, to which the 
trajectory of the sensorimotor module activity is now drawn into (Fig. 5c). Notice that the choice 
attractors have vanished. Furthermore, while the trajectory is being drawn, it moves closer 
towards and crosses the diagonal line (Fig. 5c).  Importantly, the model suggests that this new 
stable steady state plays an important role in change-of-mind – it provides the initially losing 
neuronal population a higher chance of winning.  
Due to the transient nature of the uncertainty-encoding neuronal population activity (Fig. 
1b, middle, and Supplementary Fig. 8), the excitatory feedback returns to baseline level, and 
the phase plane reverts to its initial configuration (Fig. 5d) (prior to the activation of the 
uncertainty-monitoring module (Fig. 5b)). This causes the trajectory to move towards the 
higher part of the phase plane and, coupled with noise, leads to a change-of-mind behaviour. 
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Overall, this is reflected in the reversal of dominance in the neural activities of the motor 
populations (Fig. 5a, middle) and motor movement (negative-to-positive) direction (Fig. 5a, 
bottom) (see also Supplementary Fig. 9). It should be noted that in the model, the final decision 
is determined by whether the firing rate of motor neural populations, which themselves are 
neural integrators, reach a prescribed target threshold (see Methods). Thus, change-of-mind 
could still occur even if the activity reversal is not clearly observed in the sensorimotor module.  
In our analyses we found that the new central choice-neutral stable steady state is less 
likely to emerge with higher evidence quality due to shorter response time and weaker 
excitatory feedback from the uncertainty-monitoring module (Figs. 2c and d; Supplementary 
Fig. 7). This explains why higher evidence quality generally leads to lower probability of 
change-of-mind4,35 (Figs. 4a, black). For lower evidence quality, the phase plane is almost 
symmetrical (Fig 5b). Thus, the network is likely to make an error choice initially due to noisy 
fluctuations. This can lead to longer integration time for the uncertainty-monitoring module and 
provides stronger excitatory feedback – in the form of a transient, centralized attractor state – 
and consequently, correcting the decision. Hence, this explains why there are more correct 
change-of-mind trials than error change-of-mind trials. However, increasing the evidence 
quality leads to lower probability of change-of-mind, as discussed above. This explains the 
observed peak in probability of correct changes-of-mind (Fig. 4a and Supplementary Fig. 2).  
 
Discussion 
We have proposed a novel neural circuit computational model that encodes decision 
uncertainty, the reciprocal of decision confidence. Decision uncertainty in the model can be 
represented in real-time for online excitatory feedback and for controlling decision dynamics. 
Our uncertainty-monitoring module was developed based on transient neural dynamics 
observed in animal and human studies6,25,42, and the relationship between choice certainty, 
evidence and response time12,33,34 (e.g. Supplementary Figs. 1-3). Building on our previous 
decision-making model37, our extended neural circuit model can account for several 
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observations commonly found in experimental studies of decision confidence and change-of-
mind4,6,34,35.  
A seminal paper has shown neuronal firing rates from the OFC6 can signal decision 
uncertainty encoded through its phasic activity, as in our model’s uncertainty-encoding 
population. Specifically, the magnitude of the firing rates in single neuronal recordings in 
OFC6, peaking around the response initiation time. This peak is higher the longer the animal 
waits before opting out (a measure of decision uncertainty level) (see Supplementary Fig. 3a). 
This work was extended11 by showing that inactivation of OFC neurons during an opt-out 
waiting task causally affected the animal opting out (i.e. decision uncertainty reporting) 
behaviour. More recently, EEG (theta band) and fMRI recordings have also shown neural 
activities exhibiting similar characteristics25,42, with phasic activities peaking around the 
response initiation times, and the peak was higher with higher reported uncertainty or when 
an error was detected by the participants. 
We have proposed a model that was able to exhibit higher levels of decision uncertainty 
and lower choice accuracy with more difficult tasks 6,10,36 (Fig. 2a). Further, the model showed 
higher decision uncertainty with lower evidence quality for correct choices, but counter-
intuitively, lower decision uncertainty for incorrect choices, in line with the previously observed 
‘<’ pattern6,11,33,34 (Fig. 2b, Supplementary Fig. 1). This was explained by the faster response 
times for correct choices, with lesser integration time for the uncertainty-monitoring module, 
which led to lower decision uncertainty (Figs. 2c and d). For error choices, the integration time 
was longer with higher evidence quality (Fig. 1d). This led to longer integration time for the 
uncertainty-monitoring module and hence higher decision uncertainty. Furthermore, the 
uncertainty-monitoring module provided a closed-loop recurrent network mechanism of 
excitatory feedback with the sensorimotor neuronal population, enhancing the latter’s 
responses. This was reminiscent of a dynamic gain or urgency mechanism46,47. Future work 
could test this mechanism, e.g. using a task paradigm that produces fast error choices48 and 
determining whether the ‘<’ pattern is absent.  
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By utilising a proxy memory mechanism instantiated in the existing tonic bias input to the 
uncertainty-encoding neural population, our model was also able to show that decision 
uncertainty from a correct first trial caused a slower response time in the second trial, 
compared to when the first trial was incorrect (Fig. 3a). Moreover, the model predicted a 
slightly larger difference in response times when the second responses were error choices 
than when the second responses were correct choices (Fig. 3b). This difference was more 
pronounced with increasing evidence quality. Future work could test our model’s prediction, 
for instance, by direct micro-stimulation or inactivation of the uncertainty-encoding (or outcome 
anticipation) neurons in the medial frontal cortex e.g. OFC in rodents6,11 or subregions in the 
human frontal cortex49. 
The results in Figs. 3a and b could be explained by the uncertainty level mappings (Figs. 
2b, c and d). Specifically, in pairs of coupled trials, errors in first decisions led to a higher tonic 
bias input (and subsequently, higher overall input, Fig. 2d) in second decisions, due to higher 
uncertainty levels in first error decisions (Fig. 2b, grey) than correct decisions (Fig. 2b, black), 
which resulted in stronger excitatory feedback to the sensorimotor module. This led to faster 
activity ramping up of the sensorimotor populations, which in turn caused faster error (than 
correct) response times in second decisions. Furthermore, Fig. 3b showed that such 
differential effect would be more prominent for higher evidence quality.  
The same model could exhibit changes-of-mind which were more likely to occur with lower 
evidence quality4,35 (Fig. 4a, grey). Specifically, the model showed that changes-of-mind were 
more often accompanied by correcting an impending error choice – hence more error-to-
correct changes than correct-to-error changes (Fig. 4a, bold black vs dashed black), 
consistent with previous observations4,35. Furthermore, the likelihood of error-to-correct 
changes slightly peaked at an intermediate level of evidence quality before decreasing as the 
task becomes easier4,35 (Fig. 4a, bold black). The model predicted slower response times 
during changes-of-mind, regardless of evidence quality (Fig. 4b). Critically, when we removed 
the excitatory feedback from the uncertainty-monitoring module to the sensorimotor module, 
the decision uncertainty could still be encoded, but there was no change-of-mind 
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(Supplementary Figs. 4 and 5). This demonstrated the importance of the uncertainty-induced 
excitatory feedback on changes-of-mind.  
We used phase-plane analysis to explain the change-of-mind phenomenon. First, the 
process of change-of-mind could be understood in terms of the sensorimotor network state 
being attracted to three distinct basins of attraction: the initial choice, then to the central 
choice-neutral ‘uncertain’ state, and finally to the other choice. With higher evidence quality, 
we found that the correct choice attractor dominated the phase plane, with its generally larger 
basin of attraction (e.g. Supplementary Fig. 10; see also37) and the central attractor was less 
likely to appear due to the weaker uncertainty-based excitatory feedback (e.g. compare 
Supplementary Fig. 7 to Supplementary Fig. 8). This explains the monotonic decrease of the 
probability of change-of-mind (Fig. 4a). In other words, changes-of-mind did not occur due to 
the heavily biased phase plane and fast response times. However, at low evidence quality 
levels (ε < 4%), the phase plane was almost symmetric (Fig. 5b), which led to more initial 
errors (Fig. 4a). Under such low evidence quality, it was increasingly likely that the network 
would make an initial error choice37. This led to longer integration time of the decision 
uncertainty-monitoring module and provided stronger excitatory feedback – in the form of a 
transient, central choice-neutral stable steady state – and eventually, correcting the decision 
(Figs. 5c and d, and Supplementary Figs. 8 and 9). On the contrary, increasing the evidence 
quality led to lower probability of changes-of-mind. This explains the peak in probability of 
correct changes-of-mind at an intermediate evidence quality (Fig. 4a; Supplementary Fig. 2). 
The model further suggested that during changes-of-mind, noisy fluctuation around the phase-
plane diagonal led to subtle deviations early in the trial (Fig. 5). The downstream motor 
module, which was itself a neural integrator, amplified any slight deviation and led to 
movement being initiated towards a choice target (Figs. 5a, and Supplementary Figs. 8 and 
9).  
Fig. 6a illustrates a hypothetical decision ‘potential well’37 that summarizes our key findings 
for change-of-mind– the central attractor, caused by the excitatory feedback from the decision 
uncertainty-monitoring module, and coupled with noise, can allow an initial choice to be 
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altered. The strength and basin of this attractor depends on the evidence (and elapsed time) 
for temporal integration based on the outputs of the sensorimotor neuronal populations.  
 
Figure 6. Uncertainty-induced symmetric stable steady state causes change-of-mind. (a) Top-
to-bottom: Hypothetical “potential well” of network changes over epochs within a trial (arrow). When 
making a choice between two alternatives, the strength of the stimulus (and noise) drives the ball 
towards one of the two wells (in this case, an error choice). A transient strong excitatory input (due to 
excitatory feedback from uncertainty-monitoring module) changes the “energy” landscape into one 
centralized deep well, allowing a higher chance to change its initial decision. (b) Bifurcation (or 
stability) diagram of the activity of a neuronal population selective to choice 1/Left in the sensorimotor 
module, S1, with respect to variation in the overall excitatory feedback input current from the 
uncertainty-monitoring module. Evidence quality ε=0. Black bold: stable steady states; black dotted: 
unstable saddle steady states. Dashed green: initial low uncertainty-induced excitatory feedback and 
lying within the winner-take-all regime. Dashed magenta: intermediate epoch of a trial with large 
uncertainty-induced excitatory feedback – only one stable steady state exists. Later epoch of a trial 
reverts back to green dashed line. 
 
To provide further insights, we have provided a bifurcation (or stability) analysis of the 
activity of a neuronal population (selective to choice 1/Left) in the sensorimotor module, S1, 
with respect to the systematic variation (bifurcation parameter) of the overall excitatory 
feedback input current from the uncertainty module with evidence quality 𝜀 = 0 (Fig. 6b). The 
stable steady states are denoted by black lines, while dotted lines represent the unstable 
saddle steady states. During the initial epoch of a trial, this excitatory feedback input from the 
uncertainty-monitoring module (specifically the uncertainty-encoding neuronal population) to 
the sensorimotor population is very low or zero (green vertical dashed line). This is the regular 
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winner-take-all regime37. As sensory evidence is accumulated in the sensorimotor 
populations, the uncertainty level is increased, which leads to higher excitatory feedback from 
the uncertainty-monitoring module. When the overall excitatory feedback is sufficiently large 
(larger than ~0.03nA in our simulations (vertical magenta dashed line)), the network is 
attracted towards the only present stable steady state, i.e. the choice-neutral stable steady 
state. However, this effect is only transient – in a later epoch of a trial, the neural activity of 
the uncertainty-encoding neuronal population may return towards a lower level, and the 
decision network would once again revert to the winner-take-all regime37 (vertical green 
dashed line).  
 
Unlike previous neurocomputational models35,50, our model does not rely on explicitly 
reversing the stimulus input to neural populations or having a relatively low (first) decision 
threshold (to induce faster errors). Further, it does not rely on abstract mathematical 
calculation of decision uncertainty28. Inspired by neural evidence of decision confidence6,25, 
we have a dedicated neural module that has a plausible circuit architecture resembling a 
cortical column that monitors and quantifies decision uncertainty and controls decision 
dynamics via excitatory feedback.  
Our model complements simpler computational cognitive models such as the extended 
drift-diffusion models4,27,51, by providing a neural circuit perspective on the neural mechanism 
behind decision confidence/uncertainty and change-of-mind. Specifically, our model links to 
psychophysical data (Figs. 1c, 1d, 2a, 2b, 3a, and 4a) and also directly relates to 
neurophysiological data (Figs. 1b and 5a, and Supplementary Figs. 7, 8 and 9a), which simpler 
models cannot readily do. Hence, both psychophysical (Figs. 3b and 4b) and neural (Figs. 1 
and 5, and Supplementary Figs. 7-10) predictions are naturally embedded in the model. That 
said, such biologically-motivated (mean-field) models can be linked back (through various 
model reductions and assumptions) to simpler cognitive models such as the drift-diffusion 
models37,45,51.   
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Several cognitive models have been proposed to model different roles of the medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which include error prediction52. 
However, it is unclear how the predicted ACC signals (i.e. negative and positive ‘surprise’ 
signals) in such models can influence the dynamics of decision formation53. In addition to 
explicitly modelling the dynamics of perceptual decision uncertainty, our model provides an 
account of the effect of decision uncertainty on the dynamics of the decision formation 
process; from sensory evidence integration up to motor output. This results in decision 
changes ‘on the fly’ leading to change-of-mind within a trial. 
Our distributed neural circuit model is more realistic than other biologically-motivated 
computational models of decision confidence or change-of-mind35,50. Evidence shows 
perceptual decisions are performed and distributed across multiple brain regions54. 
Specifically, the activity of our motor module can be directly transformed to motor positional 
coordinates, hence directly maps to physical output. Our model with feedforward connections 
from sensorimotor to motor modules suggests that the reversal of neural activities resembling 
a change-of-mind could be more clearly identified in more motor-based neurons than sensory-
based neurons (Fig. 5 and Supplementary Figs. 8 and 9). Future experiments could show the 
difference in neural dynamics in different brain regions during change-of-mind tasks, e.g. via 
dual recordings at the sensory and motor-based brain regions. Importantly, we consider our 
proposed model to be a reconciliation of both the bottom-up and top-down views on how 
changes-of-mind can occur. Specifically, in our model, bottom-up evidence4,55 is continually 
accumulated after the choice is made through recurrent excitation and noise fluctuation in the 
sensorimotor and motor modules, while top-down evidence25,42 is accumulated through the 
excitatory feedback loop (via the uncertainty-encoding module).  
In summary, our work has provided a neural circuit model that can compute decision 
confidence or uncertainty within and across trials while also occasionally exhibiting changes-
of-mind. The model can replicate several important observations of decision confidence and 
change-of-mind and is sufficiently simple to allow rigorous understanding of its mechanisms. 
Taken together, our modelling work has shed light on the neural circuit mechanisms 
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underlying decision confidence and change-of-mind.  
 
Methods 
Psychometric and chronometric function. We used a Weibull function56 to fit the 
psychometric function,  𝑝 = 1 − 0.5 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜀/𝛼)𝛽, where 𝑝 is the probability of a correct choice, 
𝜀 is the evidence quality, which, in the case of the random-dot stimulus57,58, is equal to the 
motion coherence level (𝑐′). With the parameters used with our model (see Supplementary 
Table 1), 𝛼 (the threshold at which the performance is 85%) is set to 7.32%, while 𝛽, the slope, 
is equal to 1.32. We defined the model’s response (or reaction) time as the overall time it took 
for the sensorimotor neuronal population activity to reach a threshold value of 35.5 Hz from 
stimulus onset time.  
  
Modelling sensorimotor populations using two-variable model. We used the reduced 
version of the spiking neural network model50 described by its two slowest dynamical 
variables, which are the population-averaged NMDA-mediated synaptic gating variables37. 
The dynamics of the two neuronal populations can be described by:  
𝑑𝑆1
𝑑𝑡
= −
𝑆1 
𝜏𝑠
+ (1 − 𝑆1)𝛾𝐻(𝑥1 , 𝑥2)          (1) 
𝑑𝑆2
𝑑𝑡
= −
𝑆2 
𝜏𝑠
+ (1 − 𝑆2)𝛾𝐻(𝑥2 , 𝑥1)          (2) 
where the two excitatory neuronal populations representing the two choice options are labelled 
1 and 2, and the 𝑆’s are the population-averaged NMDA-mediated synaptic gating variables. 𝛾 
is some fitting constant based on previous work37. 𝜏𝑆  denotes the synaptic gating time 
constant (100 ms) constrained by NMDA receptor physiology. 𝐻 denotes the nonlinear single-
cell input-output function fitted to that of a spiking neuronal model. The firing rates of the 
sensorimotor populations can be described by these three equations:  
𝐻𝑖 =
𝑎𝑥𝑖−𝑏
1−𝑒−𝑑(𝑎𝑥𝑖−𝑏)
            (3) 
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𝑥𝑖 = 𝐽𝑁,𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑖 − 𝐽𝑁,𝑖𝑗𝑆𝑗 + 𝐼0 +  𝐼𝑖 + 𝐽𝑚𝑐0𝑦𝑈        (4) 
 𝐼𝑖 = 𝐽𝐴,𝑒𝑥𝑡  𝜇0 (1 ±
𝜀
100%
)          (5) 
where 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑑 are parameters for the input-output function fitted to a leaky integrate-and-fire 
neuronal model37. The dynamical variables Si and Sj are from Eqs. 1 and 2. 𝐽𝑁,𝑖𝑖 and 𝐽𝑁,𝑖𝑗 are 
synaptic coupling constants from recurrent connections. 𝐼0 denotes a constant value that 
represents an effective bias input from the rest of the brain. 𝐼𝑖 denotes the excitatory stimulus 
input to population 𝑖, and is proportional to the evidence quality 𝜀, with the stimulus strength 
constant denoted by  μ0:  𝐼𝑖 = 𝐽𝐴,𝑒𝑥𝑡  μ0  (1 ±
𝜀
100
). 𝐽𝐴,𝑒𝑥𝑡 represents the external synaptic 
coupling constant. In addition to the features in the previous work37, the strength of excitatory 
feedback from the uncertainty-encoding population is controlled by 𝐽𝑚𝑐0. Hence, decision 
uncertainty is monitored and fed back to the sensorimotor populations via excitatory feedback.  
 
Uncertainty monitoring neuronal populations. A key aim of our modelling work is to 
understand how the neural circuit dynamics and choice behaviour can be modulated by 
decision uncertainty. In particular, our proposed uncertainty-monitoring module can lead to 
error correction through change-of-mind within a trial. It should be noted that, while modelling 
decision uncertainty, the model was constrained by the neural profile of uncertainty-encoding 
neurons (or brain regions) observed in experiments (single neuronal recording6, EEG 
recordings25, and fMRI recordings42).  
Two neural populations mimicking a canonical cortical microcircuit were implemented. One 
population, an inhibitory population, integrates the summed output of the two sensorimotor 
neuronal populations while another population, and excitatory population, monitors decision 
uncertainty. Their dynamics are described by:   
𝜏𝑚𝑐
𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑛ℎ
𝑑𝑡
= [𝐽𝑉,𝑖𝑛ℎ(𝐻𝑖 + 𝐻𝑗) − 𝑔]+ − 𝑦𝑖𝑛ℎ        (6) 
𝜏𝑚𝑐
𝑑𝑦𝑈
𝑑𝑡
= [𝜇 − 𝐽𝑁,𝑖𝑛ℎ 𝑦𝑖𝑛ℎ − 𝑔]+ − 𝑦𝑈         (7) 
 24 
where yinh  and yU are the dynamical variables of the inhibitory neuronal population and 
uncertainty-encoding population, respectively. [ ]+  denotes a threshold-linear input-output 
function (with a threshold of 0), with its input argument in units of nA. 𝐽𝑉,𝑖𝑛ℎ denotes a synaptic 
coupling constant from the sensorimotor populations to the inhibitory neuronal population. 𝐻𝑖  
and 𝐻𝑗 are the neuronal population firing rates from the sensorimotor populations 𝑖, 𝑗. 𝑔 
represents some top-down inhibition (1000 nA) on the uncertainty-encoding (and inhibitory) 
population from beginning of trial, which is removed 500ms from Eqs. (6) and (7) after stimulus 
onset, respectively (see Supplementary Figure 11 where the effect of this timing feature on 
the model performance was explored). We used these delay values for all the figures in the 
main text and in Supplementary Information, unless noted otherwise (see Fig. 1). When the 
activity of one of the sensorimotor neuronal populations crosses a threshold value (35.5 𝐻𝑧), 
𝑔 is reactivated (3000 nA). This results in the activity pattern of uncertainty-monitoring module 
to mimic data observed in neural recordings6,25 (see Fig. 1b, middle panel). 𝐽𝑁,𝑖𝑛ℎ denotes the 
inhibition strength from the inhibitory neuronal population to uncertainty-encoding neuronal 
population, while 𝜇 is some excitatory constant bias input that can be modulated (only in multi-
stage decisions) by decision uncertainty from the first trial in a pair of coupled-trials (see 
below).  
 
Motor neuronal populations. Similar to the uncertainty-monitoring neuronal populations, we 
dynamically modelled the motor output module using threshold-linear functions (with threshold 
value of 0). Two neural populations selective for right and left – with mutual inhibition – were 
used. The persistent activity can be maintained using mutual inhibition to create a line attractor 
model59.  The dynamics of the neuronal populations for the two choices (1 and 2) are described 
by:  
𝜏ℎ
𝑑𝑦𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= [𝐽 𝐻1 − 𝐽𝑁,𝐿𝑅 𝑦𝑅 − 𝑔]+ − 𝑦𝐿          (8) 
𝜏ℎ
𝑑𝑦𝑅
𝑑𝑡
= [𝐽 𝐻2 − 𝐽𝑁,𝑅𝐿 𝑦𝐿 − 𝑔]+ −  𝑦𝑅                          (9) 
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where yR and yL are the dynamical variables of the left and right motor neuronal populations, 
respectively. 𝐻1 and 𝐻2 are the firing rates from the two corresponding sensorimotor 
populations (Fig. 1), and the associated coupling constant J = 1 nA Hz-1. 𝐽𝑁,𝑖𝑗 denotes a 
coupling constant from population 𝑖 to population 𝑗. The negative sign indicates connectivity 
is effectively inhibitory. Similar to the uncertainty-monitoring module, 𝑔 represents some top-
down inhibition (1000 nA) on the motor populations from beginning of trial and is removed 
when the activity of one of the sensorimotor neuronal populations crosses a threshold value 
(35.5 𝐻𝑧 ).  
 
Mapping the activity of the motor module to X position. The motor module output as a 
position in the 𝑥 directional space is approximated by a linear function:  
𝑥 = 𝑞(yL− yR)                              (10) 
where 𝑞 is a constant scaling factor with a value determined by the equation: 
𝑞 = |𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠|/𝑀𝑡ℎ                     (11) 
where 𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠 is the hypothetical position of the two opposing choice targets. 1366x768 is one 
of the most commonly used screen resolutions. Therefore, in the model, this value is set to 
750 or -750 (close to the edge of the x dimension). 𝑀𝑡ℎ is the motor target threshold, set to 
17.4 Hz.  
 
Uncertainty within a single trial. We used two measures to quantify the level of decision 
uncertainty in a trial. For the first measure, we used the maximum firing rate value of the 
uncertainty-encoding population for each trial 𝑛, allowing real-time monitoring of decision 
uncertainty. For a specific evidence quality value, we calculated the trial-averaged and SEM 
of these maximal values. For the second measure, we calculated the area under the curve of 
the firing rate activity over time of the uncertainty-encoding population using the trapezoidal 
numerical integration scheme for each trial 𝑛. This provides an overall quantification of 
decision confidence after a choice is made. It also acts as a proxy for any downstream neural 
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integrator that temporally integrates real-time decision uncertainty information. Again, for each 
evidence quality value, we calculated the mean and SEM of the areas. Either measure of 
decision uncertainty is then normalised using feature scaling to bring all values within the 
range [0,1]. This is done by:  
𝑋′ =
𝑋− 𝑋𝑚𝑖𝑛 
 𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑥−  𝑋𝑚𝑖𝑛
                         (11)       
 
Uncertainty across coupled trials.  In coupled trials, the evidence quality of the second trial 
was selected probabilistically from a uniform distribution, where ε ∈
[0, 3.2, 6.4, 12.8, 25.6, 51.2]. The area under the curve of the summed activity of the uncertainty-
encoding population at trial 𝑛 , 𝑋𝑛 , is transformed and stored into some activity measure 𝐶 in 
the subsequent trial. We used a simple linear transformation described by     
𝐶𝑛+1 = 𝛼𝑋𝑛 +  𝛽                        (12) 
where 𝑛 denotes the trial number, 𝛼 and 𝛽 are scaling parameters. The parameter values set 
in this work are 𝛼 = 0.008 𝑛𝐴 and 𝛽 = 0.5 𝑛𝐴. This value of 𝐶𝑛+1 is then used to modulate the 
tonic input (and hence baseline activity) of the uncertainty-encoding population (𝜇, in equation 
(7)) in the second trial using the following update:  
𝜇 → 𝜇 + 𝐶𝑛+1                                     (13) 
Upon the completion of a pair of coupled trials, the uncertainty bias 𝐶𝑛+1 , stored in 𝜇, is reset 
to 0.  
 
Regression and classification of model outputs.  We used a smoothing spline function in 
MATLAB to fit the model’s decision accuracy as function of uncertainty level. We also 
performed a linear regression on all our simulated response times with decision uncertainty 
levels (𝑅2=0.993). The two variables were highly correlated (Pearson’s r = 0.85, p-value = 0) 
(see Supplementary Fig. 6). The model behaviour is identified to have a change-of-mind if 
there is a reversal in the order of dominance between the two motor neuronal population firing 
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rates, i.e. if there is a change in the sign of 𝑥  (eq. 10), and a choice target is eventually reached 
(before a 4 s timeout – see below) (see Fig. 5a, and Supplementary Figs. 8 and 9).  
 
Simulation and analysis. The code to simulate the model was written in MATLAB (version 
2018a) and was run on a Mac OS X workstation. The forward Euler-Maruyama numerical 
integration scheme with an integration time step of 0.5 ms was used for numerical integration 
of the dynamical equations (describing dynamics within a trial). Smaller time steps were 
checked (e.g. 0.01 ms) without affecting the results. XPPAUT60 was used to perform 
dynamical systems (phase-plane) analysis and for parameter search on each neural module 
and for the bifurcation analysis. The model’s parameter values are summarized in 
Supplementary Table 1. The model was simulated under a response-time task paradigm with 
a timeout of 4 s. The stimulus appeared 900 ms after a trial has begun. Only 2.2% of the total 
simulated trials (8000 trials per condition) were indecision trials in which the motor activity did 
not cross the 17.4 Hz threshold, i.e. choice target was not reached. These simulated trials 
were discarded and not included in our analyses.  
 
Selection of parameter values. Please refer to Supplementary Table 1 for more information 
on how the parameter values were selected. In some cases, parameters were adopted from 
previous work37. Some parameter values, such as 𝐽𝑚𝑐0 (coupling strength between the 
uncertainty-encoding and sensorimotor populations) and the integration timing parameters 
were selected to fit qualitative aspects of existing observations (“<” pattern6,11,33,34, probability 
of changes-of-mind4, neural profile of experimentally-observed uncertainty-encoding neurons 
and regions6,25). We describe the effect of changing these parameter values on model 
behaviour in Supplementary Figs. 4 and 11.    
 
Data Availability 
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Code written in MATLAB and XPPAUT was used to simulate the model and generate the 
figures. The code is hosted at the following GitHub repository :  
https://github.com/nidstigator/uncertainty_com_modelling 
The accompanied ‘README’ file includes detailed instructions on how to reproduce these all 
the figures in the main manuscript and Supplementary Information.  
All data shown was generated via simulating the model (see above). No data collection was 
performed. The ‘README’ file in our Github repo (see above) clearly outlines instructions on 
how to generate the data.  
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